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Appointed Counsel to Protect the Child
Victim's Rights
Charles L. Hobson*
INTRODUCTION
Child sexual abuse is one of the most destructive crimes society
faces. One study has shown that thirty eight percent of females in
randomly selected households in a large western city reported having
been sexually abused before the age of eighteen.' A survey of college
students showed that nineteen percent of the women and nine percent
of the men reported having been victims of sexual abuse.2 Sexual
assault can have a profound effect on a child including "withdrawal,
anxiety symptoms, enuresis (bed-wetting), guilt, school problems,
delinquent or antisocial behavior and also lack of self-esteem." '3
Unfortunately, the child's harm does not end with the molestation.
Our criminal justice system is geared toward guaranteeing a fair trial
for the defendant, not towards minimizing the trauma to the victim. 4
Thus, the act of prosecuting the molester can add to the trauma
already suffered by the victimized child.-
* Attorney, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation; J.D. 1987, University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law; A.B. 1984, University of California.
1. Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. Soc.
IssuEs 125, 126 (1984).
2. Id.
3. Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17
NEW ENrG. L. REv. 643, 649 (1982).
4. See id. at 643-644.
5. Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice
System, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 977, 984 (1969).
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The harm our system does to the child can be minimized. Legis-
latures and courts can develop procedures to minimize the harm the
legal system does to the child while preserving the defendant's con-
stitutional rights. One example of this is section 288 subdivision (d)
of the California Penal Code. 6 Subdivisions (a) through (c) of Penal
Code section 288 define the crime of child molestation and set its
punishment. 7 Subdivision (d), added by the legislature in 1981,
provides the means to help molested children through the criminal
justice system.
In any arrest or prosecution under this section or under Section
288.5 the peace officer, the district attorney, and the court shall
consider the needs of the child victim and shall do whatever is
necessary, within existing budgetary resources, and constitutionally
permissible to prevent psychological harm to the child victim.9
The broad wording of section 288(d) lends itself to many uses.
This Article will focus on one way section 288(d) can be used-to
appoint counsel for the molested child in a prosecution under section
288, and one tactic for the child's attorney to employ-using Rule
2-100 subdivision (a) of California's Rules of Professional Conduct 0
to keep defendant's attorney from interviewing the child outside of
court without the consent of the child's attorney." This Article will
also argue that the main case interpreting section 288(d), Hochheiser
v. Superior Court,2 gives an unnecessarily restrictive reading of
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(d) (Vest Supp. 1990).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a)-(c) (Vest Supp. 1989).
8. In 1981, the legislature enacted section 288(c) which read:
In any arrest or prosecution under this section the peace officer, the district attorney,
and the court shall consider the needs of the child victim and shall do whatever is
necessary and constitutionally permissible to prevent psychological harm to the child
victim.
1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 1064, sec. 1, at 4093 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(c)). In 1987, the
legistlature changed subdivision (c) to subdivision (d) without any change in its language. 1987
Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1068, sec. 3, at 443 (Vest) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 288). In 1989,
the legislature amended section 288(d) to its present form, adding section 288.5 of the California
Penal Code (continuous sexual abuse of a child) to the crimes covered by section 288(d), and
adding the phrase "within existing budgetary resources." 1989 Cal. Leg. Serv. ch. 1402, sec.
3, at 5256 (west) (amending Cal. Penal Code § 288). To avoid confusion all references will
be made to subdivision (d).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(d) (West Supp. 1990).
10. "While representing a client, a member shall not communicate directly or indirectly
about the subject of the representation with a party the member knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the member has the consent of the other lawyer." CAL.
Civ. & CRIm. R., PROF. CONDUCT 2-100 (West Interim Annot. Serv. No. 1 1989). Rule 2-100
can also be found in West's separate California Rules of Court publication. CALIFORNIA RULES
OF COURT, RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2-100, at 865 (West Revised ed. 1989).
11. See infra notes 150-196 and accompanying text.
12. 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
692
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section 288(d), and does not apply to a court appointing an attorney
under section 288(d). 13 Finally, this Article will demonstrate that the
child's attorney can use Rule 2-100 of California's Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct to limit contact between the child and defense counsel
without violating defendant's constitutional rights.1
4
I. APPOINTING AN ATTORNEY FOR MOLESTED CHILDREN
A. Helping the Victims
Often many child abuse cases are not reported because of the
treatment the child victim receives within the judicial process. Mental
health professionals have found that legal proceedings can have a
profoundly disturbing effect on the mental and emotional health of
the child victim. Stigma, embarrassment and trauma to the child,
sometimes with lifelong ramifications, are increased by involvement
in the current judicial system. The effect can serve to perpetuate a
problem which is already self-perpetuating, especially in incest cases.'
5
While our system of prosecuting criminals can be difficult for any
victim of crime,' 6 children face special difficulty as they lack the
adult's maturity and sophistication to help them cope with the
vicissitudes of the criminal justice system. The ordeal of the molested
child is even more difficult as the child must bear the burden of
being the primary source of testimony to a particularly repulsive
crime. ' 7
A criminal case can harm the molested child in many ways.
"[R]epeated interrogations and cross-examination; facing the accused
again; the official atmosphere in court; the acquittal of the accused
for want of corroborating evidence to the child's trustworthy testi-
mony; and the conviction of a molester who is a child's parent or
relative can all afflict the molested child."' 8 The harm that can be
13. See infra notes 73-149 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 150-245 and accompanying text.
15. Avery, The Child Abuse Witness: Potential for Secondary Victimization, 7 CRIM.
JusT. J. 1, 3-4 (1983).
16. ViLMoARE & BENvENuTI, CALiFoRNA VicTims oF CRuAE HANDBOOC 8 (1988).
17. Child abuse is one of the most difficult problems to detect and prosecute, in large
part because there are often no witnesses except the victim. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S.
39, 60 (1987). See Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault,
40 J. Soc. Sci. 125 (1984).
18. Libai, supra note 5, at 984.
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done by the criminal justice system is so great that some see that
"modern court procedure ... renders the court both the child
protector of last resort and one of the most serious perpetrators of
child abuse." 19 Examples of the harms the criminal justice system
can inflict on the molested child are legion.
A child was the victim of a stranger's sexual molestation at age 12.
The facts did not become known to the prosecutor (often the case)
until she was 17. The case was dismissed on the basis of psychiatric
advice that the child could not testify without having a total
emotional breakdown. The child's approach to emotional survival,
typically, had been to forget, forget, forget. Reinforcing her memory
of this event would have been devastating. 20
California provides another example of the harm the criminal justice
system can do to molested children.
The mother of eight and one-half to nine-year-old S.W. testified
that when her son exited the courtroom after his 1982 preliminary
hearing testimony, he was "totally distraught ... in tears and
couldn't ... talk" and "started reverting back to baby-like behav-
ior," such as wanting to wear diapers. When she told him the week
before the June 15, 1984 hearing that he would be coming to court
to testify, he burst into tears and went up to his room, indicating
that there was no way he was going back to court and that if he
did come back to court he would say "I don't know anything."
She claimed he started to talk baby talk and picked up a diaper
that his mother was using as a rag, and waived it at her. 2
Not surprisingly, some experts believe that bringing charges in a
child molestation case can actually compound the harm already done
to the child victim.22 This comports with the belief of "child psy-
chiatrists that the degree of psychic trauma is as much, or perhaps
more, dependent on the way that the child victim is treated after
discovery than at the time of the offense itself.' '23 Thus we are
confronted with the problem that the benefits of successfully prose-
cuting the child molester may be outweighed by the harm our legal
system does to the child victim.
The criminal justice system does not harm just the children; society
also suffers as child victims become unwilling to testify in molestation
19. Parker, supra note 3, at 643.
20. State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 415, 484 A.2d 1330, 1333 (1984).
21. Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 781, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 275.
22. Parker, supra note 3, at 644.
23. Libai, supra note 5, at 981.
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cases due to the harm done to them by the criminal justice system.
For example, in the New Jersey case of State v. Sheppard:24
One attorney, who had handled 30 to 40 of these [child molestation]
cases for the State, was able to complete a trial in only one. In
most, while the child victim was able to provide her with information
sufficient to support a prosecution and was sometimes able to appear
with difficulty before a grand jury, she could not testify in court
face-to-face with the accused and other relatives advanced the
opinion that their child patients could not survive the trauma
attending a courtroom appearance. 25
The costs to the children associated with prosecuting molesters can
result in an even greater bias by prosecutors towards plea bargaining
to minimize the damage court proceedings will do to the child
victims. 26 The burden the criminal justice system places on the child
also adds to the problem of the child's recanting. A major difficulty
in prosecuting child molestation cases is the victim recanting his
original statement. 27 This problem is intimately tied to the situation
where the victim is compelled to participate in the judicial process. 28
While the child victim initially may reveal the "information about
the abuse to a trusted friend, non-abusing parent, counselor or
teacher," 29 this statement often leads to a "confusing and frightening
array of interrogations. "30 When added to the great distress that the
initial accusation of child abuse can give to the family,3 it is easy
to understand why the victim later may want to recant the initial
accusation. Finally, the trauma associated with the criminal justice
system can stifle the reporting of child molestation due to the trauma
of pretrial and trial procedures for the victim.
32
The courts are also aware of the problems our criminal justice
system causes to child molestation victims. For example, one court
noted that:
24. State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984).
25. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. at 417, 484 A.2d at 1333. Another attorney in Sheppard
testified that "[n]early 90% of the child abuse cases were dismissed as a result of problems
attending the testimony of children." Id.
26. Libai, supra note 5, at 1007.
27. Avery, supra note 15, at 13.
28. Id. at 13-14.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Mlyniec & Dally, See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child Sexual Abuse Victims Be
Accomplished Without Endangering Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 40 U. MiAma L. REv.
115, 137 (1985). The harm done to the child by the criminal justice system is not limited to
ordeal of the trial. One particularly harmful aspect of pretrial procedures to the child is his
being repeatedly required to retell to strangers the details of his molestation. See infra notes
151-57 and accompanying text.
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[clertainly a five year old girl should be spared the necessity of
testifying against her father in a rape case if at all possible....
We do not agree ... that five year old girls should be dragged in
to re-live the horrifying experience of being raped.33
In State v. Conklin,34 the Minnesota Supreme Court listed the litany
of problems the molested child had at trial including: "[t]he unfa-
miliar courtroom setting, the necessity of speaking to strangers about
embarrassing events, the presence of a jury [and] the problems with
language and mutual comprehension." ' '35 A California court also has
recognized the harm the system can do to the child by requiring the
child to describe the crime in "intimate detail" in front of the public,
defendant and his supporters.3 6
The leading case interpreting section 288(d), Hochheiser v. Superior
Court,37 did not agree with this position. The Hochheiser court, in
deciding that section 288(d) did not justify televising the molested
children's testimony based its decision in part on the lack of support
for the idea that testifying to their molestation harmed the children."
The Hochheiser court found that the people had not proven that
testifying in the presence of the jury and the accused was psycholog-
ically damaging to the sexually abused child.39 The court found that
the literature supporting this view "contains generalized statements
to this effect"'' 4 and does not provide the empirical proof necessary
to justify this claim. 41
The Hochheiser court placed excessive emphasis on empirical ver-
ification. The court failed to realize that there is a problem with
verifying whether our legal system or any one part of it harms child
molestation victims. The effects the component parts of the prose-
cution have on the child mix together. Also, the effects the prose-
cution have on the children mix with the effects of the crime on
each child. Thus it is difficult to determine how much harm any
particular part of the criminal justice system does to the child.
As one commentator explained:
33. State v. Boodry, 96 Ariz. 259, 263-65, 394 P.2d 196, 200 (1964).
34. 444 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1989).
35. Id. at 273.
36. Eversole v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 3d 188, 200, 195 Cal. Rptr. 816, 823-24
(1983).
37. 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
38. Id. at 791, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
39. Id. at 792-93, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
40. Id. at 793, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
41. Id. at 792, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
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The studies do not as yet demonstrate a clear causal link between
the legal proceedings and the child victim's mental disturbances;
but no psychiatric study has attempted to prove, or is likely to
attempt to prove, in the future, such a causal link. Psychiatrists
agree that they cannot isolate the effects of the 'crime trauma' from
the prior personality damage or either of the foregoing from the
'environment reaction trauma' or the 'legal process trauma.' But
psychiatrists do agree that when some victims encounter the law
enforcement system, for one reason or another, the child requires
special care and treatment.42
Furthermore, some empirical support exists for the notion that crim-
inal proceedings harm child molestation victims. 43 Finally, simple
common sense agrees with "the opinions of most psychiatrists,
psychologists, judges and parents that the mental health of the child
should be given substantial consideration and protected where pos-
sible by the criminal justice system." 44 Litigation is an unpleasant
experience for any lay participant. When the participant is a child
who is the victim of one of the most atrocious crimes capable of
commission, and who must repeat frequently and in graphic detail
the acts committed against him, it is easy to see that the molested
child can be in grave danger from our legal system.
Appointing counsel to represent the molested child is an excellent
way to protect him from the emotional harm caused by the criminal
action. One of the greatest problems the child molestation victim has
is that he4s has no one to stand up for him. The defendant has his
own counsel and a host of constitutional protections to support him
through the ordeal of litigation." The child, however, has had no
such protections until very recently.
While the tide has recently changed for the better, the molested
child still needs more support. While he is entitled to a support
person while he testifies47 and will have the support of government
agencies such as Children's Protective Services and the district attor-
ney's office, the child molestation victim has no one who will stand
up for his rights and enforce them. The support persons and social
workers are invariably lay people and therefore incapable of fully
42. Libai, supra note 5, at 1015 (emphasis added).
43. See id. at 982.
44. Id. at 1015.
45. Both the victim and the perpetrator of child molestation can be male or female. For
the sake of convenience, references will be made to the masculine pronoun.
46. Parker, supra note 3, at 643-44.
47. CAL. PEA.L CODE § 868.5 (,Vest Supp. 1989).
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understanding and adequately protecting the child's rights and inter-
ests. The district attorney, while well-meaning, may have a conflict
of interest with the child. While district attorneys will want to
minimize the trauma a prosecution does to the child, the district
attorney's main interest is convicting the molester. The duty of the
Attorney General and the district attorneys is "to see that the laws
of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced. ' 48 They have
no duty to protect the interests of the victim, regardless of the
consequences to the prosecution. Thus, the district attorney may have
a conflict between his interest in helping the child and his interest in
successfully prosecuting the molester. 49
An appointed attorney, however, combines the best of both worlds.
Like the social worker, he can give his undivided attention to the
child's emotional welfare, and, like the district attorney, he has the
legal knowledge that allows him to protect the child's interests and
rights. By having an attorney to represent him, the child will have
someone who understands court procedures and thus "protect the
well-being of young complaining witnesses throughout the judicial
process. ' ' 50 The attorney will be able to recognize what is excessively
harsh or repetitious questioning, how often the child will be inter-
viewed and what steps can be taken to prevent unnecessary interviews,
how long the prosecution will take, how important the child is as a
witness and how to protect the child from any unnecessary procedures
that may harm him.
If the child is deprived of appointed counsel he will be left alone.
No one else will have the motivation and the expertise to protect
him as well as appointed counsel can. Given the tender age and
tremendous vulnerability of the molested child, he deserves every
constitutionally permissible protection. It would be a tragedy to allow
the misinterpretation of section 288(d) in Hochheiser' to prevent
courts from appointing counsel for molested children. Hochheiser
deprives courts of an important tool for alleviating the great pain
our criminal justice system can cause the child molestation victim.
48. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
49. See CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA CHILD VICTIM WITNESS
JUDIcIAL ADVISORY CommrITTE, FnIAL REPORT 67 (1988). While the district attorney also has
a duty to help the child under section 288(d), his first duty must still be to prosecute the
molester. The district attorney's duty to prosecute is a constitutional duty and thus not limited
by section 288(d). See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
50. Parker, supra note 3, at 653.
51. See infra notes 89-149 and accompanying text.
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B. Hochheiser v. Superior Court
One California case has analyzed fully the reach of section 288(d).
In Hochheiser v. Superior Court5 2 the trial court ordered that the
complaining witnesses' testimony in a child molestation prosecution
be taken by closed-circuit television outside the courtroom.5 3 The
trial court used only its inherent power to control the courtroom and
develop new procedures to justify this order.54 The Hochheiser court
did not accept the trial court's position, citing California's prosecu-
torial discovery cases55 for the point that courts should not invent
rules of criminal procedure involving important issues of constitu-
tional law without legislative authorization .5  The Attorney General
tried to bolster the trial court's position by using section 288(d).5 1
The Hochheiser court gave a very narrow reading of section
288(d).5 8 It found that the use of closed-circuit television could
threaten defendant's due process, public trial and confrontation
rights.5 9 Therefore, the court felt that it should not read such a
procedure into section 288(d). The court explained: "But we cannot
read into this statute a legislative mandate for a closed-circuit tele-
vision procedure or, indeed, any other specific procedure, which so
drastically affects the rights of a defendant.''6°
In addition to the threat posed to defendant's public trial, due
process and confrontation rights, the Hochheiser court also noted
that "there are serious questions about the effects on the jury of
using closed-circuit television to present the testimony of an absent
witness since the camera becomes the juror's eyes, selecting and
commenting upon what is seen." '61 The court felt that the lighting or
52. 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
53. Id. at 780, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
54. Id. at 782, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
55. People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43, 634 P.2d 534, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981); Reynolds
v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974) (courts could not
create rules of criminal procedure to allow the prosecution to obtain discovery from defendant).
56. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 783-88, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 276-80.
57. At the time Hochheiser was decided, this subdivision was numbered 288(c), but all
references will be made to 288(d). See supra note 8. At the time Hochheiser was decided
288(d) did not include the phrase "within existing budgetary resources." See supra note 8.
This does not, however, change the analysis of Hochheiser's misconstruction of 288(d). See
infra note 121.
58. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 791, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 282.
59. Id. at 785-86, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
60. Id. at 791, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
61. Id. at 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
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the camera angle used could "affect the jurors' impressions of the
witnesses' demeanor and credibility." 6 2 The court analogized the
effect of closed-circuit testimony on the jury's perception of defen-
dant to that of shackling defendant at trial. The Hochheiser court
felt that "the presentation of a witness' testimony via closed-circuit
television may affect the presumption of innocence by creating prej-
udice in the minds of the jurors similar to that created by the use
of physical restraints in the jury's presence." 63
The Hochheiser court supported its reasoning by purporting to
ascertain the legislative intent behind section 288(d). The court de-
termined that the Summary of 1981 Crime Legislation Report com-
piled by the Joint Committee for the Revision of the Penal Code
found that section 288(d) only mandated a "philosophical change
focusing on the minor's needs." 64 The court also held that "[t]he
flurry of legislative activity after the passage of [then] subdivision
(c) of section 288, argues against the broad interpretation of the
statute.' '65 The court felt that the enactment of Penal Code section
868. 566 and the amendment of section 767 of the Evidence Code67
after the enactment of section 288(d) demonstrated that the legislature
did not intend for section 288(d) to be construed broadly. The court
explained that "[t]here would be no reason to pass such legislation
if subdivision (c) already provided such remedies." ' 63
Finally, the Hochheiser court relied on the rule of construction
that where "language reasonably susceptible to more than one con-
struction is used in a penal law, the construction which is more
favorable to the defendant should be adopted. ' 69 Therefore, the
court justified interpreting the broadly worded section 288(d) very
narrowly because such a narrow interpretation favored the defendant
in this criminal case.
In its attempt to keep from making a dramatic break from current
law without more specific legislative authority, 70 the Hochheiser court
62. Id.
63. Id. at 787, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
64. Id. at 791, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
65. Id.
66. CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.5 (West Supp. 1989) (allowing a support person to accompany
a testifying minor victim of a sex offense during the victim's testimony).
67. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1423, sec. 1, at 4994 (amending CAL. Evm. CODE § 767) (permitting
leading questions to a child involving prosecutions under section 288(d)).
68. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 791, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
69. Id. at 792, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
70. Id.
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noted its concern that televised testimony posed a serious threat to
defendant's constitutional rights. "The mere presence and gravity of
these significant questions and concerns render it inappropriate to
create by ad hoc judicial fiat such a drastic departure from established
procedures. ' 71 The court was unwilling to uphold the trial court's
action unless giving testimony over closed-circuit television was spe-
cifically authorized by the legislature. As it felt that no such authority
existed, the Hochheiser court refused to allow what it saw as a new,
constitutionally-suspect procedure. The court explained "[a]s we have
previously noted, legislative enactments should not be construed to
overthrow long-established principles of law unless such an intention
is clearly shown by express declaration or necessary implication.''72
C. Distinguishing Hochheiser
The question has arisen in some child abuse prosecutions as to
whether Hochheiser prohibits appointment of counsel for the victim. 73
Hochheiser can be factually distinguished from the procedure dis-
cussed in this article, and, to the extent Hochheiser forbids courts
from using section 288(d) to fashion new procedures to help child
victims, Hochheiser is wrongly decided and should not be followed.
The obvious difference between the procedure used in Hochheiser
and appointing an attorney for the molested child is that two com-
pletely different procedures are used to protect the victims. The
difference between giving testimony via closed-circuit television and
appointing an attorney to represent the victims is more than super-
ficial. The two procedures use different methods to protect the child
victim, conflict with different interests of the defendant and differ
in the degree to which each conflicts with a defendant's rights.
1. Different Procedures
The trial court in Hochheiser used closed-circuit television to help
isolate the victim from the defendant.74 Televising the testimony via
closed-circuit television addresses the fear the victim has when testi-
71. Id.
72. Id. at 791-792, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
73. That argument has been made in the pending case of People v. Pitts, No. F006225
(Cal. App. 5th Dist. March 27, 1989).
74. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 781-782, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 275-276.
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fying in front of defendant. Retelling to strangers the details of the
crime committed against him is difficult enough for the child moles-
tation victim. 75 The problem becomes more pronounced when the
child has to give this testimony in front of the defendant and
physically confront him.7 6 Therefore closed-circuit television can be
used to distance the child from the defendant and avoid the terror
of having to meet his nemesis face to face in court.
While Hochheiser was not decided on constitutional grounds, it is
clear where the court's sympathies stood. 77 "The issue of allowing
the complaining witness to testify via closed-circuit television from a
separate room, instead of being examined in the courtroom is no
less constitutionally questionable than were the discovery issues our
supreme court declined to resolve in Reynolds and Collie. '78
The Hochheiser court's doubts about the wisdom of the trial court's
actions motivated it to refuse to extend section 288(d) to cover
televised testimony. The court felt that the legislature did not intend
"such a fundamental change in organic law which would abrogate
traditional statutory rights to the presence of the testifying witness
in the courtroom with the defendant." 79 Because the Hochheiser
court saw the trial court's use of closed-circuit television testimony
as a radical change in courtroom procedure that endangers defen-
dant's statutory and constitutional rights, it felt that it could not
extend section 288(d) to cover such a situation.
Appointing an attorney to represent the victim's psychological
interests is neither as radical nor as dangerous to defendants as was
the televised testimony in Hochheiser.80 Appointing an attorney to
represent someone in a legal proceeding is hardly an original idea.
Courts nationwide have been required to appoint counsel for accused
felons for over twenty-five years.8' California has had this rule even
75. See Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 1, at 133. For the problems a child victim of
sexual abuse has in testifying, see Libai, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
76. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2809 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 787, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
78. Id. at 785, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (citing People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43, 634 P.2d
534, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981); Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117
Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974)).
79. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 791, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
80. This Article does not take the position that using closed-circuit television to help some
child victims of sexual abuse to testify is either constitutionally suspect or contrary to
defendant's statutory rights. Resolving the validity of the procedure used in Hochheiser is not
necessary to determine the validity of appointing an attorney under section 288(d). What is
important is that the Hochheiser court believed that the use of televised testimony was suspect.
81. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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longer. 2 The appointment of counsel is not limited to the criminal
law. A person is entitled appointed counsel in a variety of commit-
ment proceedings.83
Appointed counsel is especially common where children are con-
cerned. Under section 237.5 of the Civil Code, the court must appoint
counsel for the minor in emancipation proceedings "[i]f the court
finds that the interests of the minor require the representation of
counsel . .. whether or not the minor is able to afford counsel. '84
Indigent minors have a right to appointed counsel in delinquency
proceedings,85 and, under certain circumstances, so do their parents
or guardians.16 Appointing an attorney to help protect the psycho-
logical well-being of children is not a "wholesale revision in the
entire procedural format of a criminal trial." '8 7 Appointment of
counsel under section 288 simply extends the idea that attorneys
should be provided for those people who need them but are not able
to obtain counsel on their own.88 While the court's power to appoint
an attorney for the children under section 288(d) is neither dependent
upon nor derived from these other rights to appointed counsel, the
prevalence of appointed counsel in our legal system shows that
allowing one more type of appointed counsel will not cause the
drastic disruption of the legal system that so concerned the Hoch-
heiser court.
2. Different Interests
Appointing an attorney for the child also does not raise the second
problem feared by the Hochheiser court; i.e. constriction of defen-
dant's constitutional and statutory rights. The use of closed-circuit
television to obtain testimony in Hochheiser did raise serious consti-
tutional problems, especially with defendant's right to confronta-
82. In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 790, 350 P.2d 116, 119, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364, 367 (1960);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 859 (West Supp. 1989).
83. See, e.g., CAL. WVELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5275 (habeas corpus from detention by
certification for intensive treatment), 5276 (same), 5302 (petition for post-certification treatment)
(West 1984 & Supp. 1989).
84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 237.5(a) (West Supp. 1989).
85. CAL. WVELF. & INST. CODE § 679 (West Supp. 1989).
86. Id. § 634 (West Supp. 1989).
87. Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 791, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 282
(1984).
88. See MODEL RuLts OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983).
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tion. 9 Unlike the order given in Hochheiser, however, appointing an
attorney to represent the child's psychological interests does no direct
harm to the defendant. While the actions of the child's attorney may
have the potential to harm defendant, 90 the appointment itself has
no effect on defendant's interests. As the appointment itself does no
harm to defendant, it is, therefore, not as inherently dangerous as
the procedure attacked in Hochheiser.
Hochheiser also gives a very suspect reading of section 288(d). 91
Therefore courts should decline to go beyond Hochheiser, even by a
fraction of an inch. 92 The differences between giving testimony over
closed-circuit television and appointing counsel for the child provide
more than the fraction of the inch necessary to distinguish Hoch-
heiser.
D. Interpreting Section 288(d)
Hochheiser gives a faulty interpretation of section 288(d). While
the court never gave a reason for its narrow reading of section 288(d)
other than a desire to interpret statutes in favor of criminal defen-
dants, 93 it is logical to assume that it allowed its fear of the consti-
tutional threat to defendant posed by televised testimony to drive the
Hochheiser court to a very narrow interpretation of section 288(d). 91
The Hochheiser court, in its rush to protect the defendant, forgot
the basic principle of statutory construction and legislated section
288(d) into nothingness. A fair reading of section 288(d), taking into
account the interests served by the statute and the best way to protect
those interests, will find that section 288(d) gives the court the
authority to appoint counsel to protect the victim's psychological
interests.
Any interpretation of a statute must begin with the text of the
statute. Section 288(d) provides:
In any arrest or prosecution under this section or section 288.5 the
peace officer, the district attorney, and the court shall consider the
needs of the child victim and shall do whatever is necessary, within
89. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 786 n.2, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278 n.2. See Coy v.
Iowa, 108 S. Ct. at 2802. But see supra note 80.
90. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 93-149 and accompanying text.
92. Cf., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
93. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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existing budgetary resources, and constitutionally permissible to
prevent psychological harm to the child victim. 95
Hochheiser, in determining that section 288(d) did not authorize
courts to order the giving of testimony via closed-circuit television,
relied on its view of the legislative history of section 288(d) to support
its holding. 96 The Hochheiser court ignored the actual words of the
statute. Instead, it looked to committee hearings that never mentioned
using closed-circuit television, 97 and a statement regarding section 288
in the Summary of 1981 Crime Legislation Report9s to determine
that section 288(d) only required "a philosophical change focusing
on the minors' needs. ' 99
Legislative reports, hearings, and digests can be useful in inter-
preting a statute.10 Before resorting to legislative history, however,
a court must first attempt to ascertain the plain meaning of the
language of the statute. As Justice Traynor stated:
The will of the Legislature must be determined from the statutes;
intentions cannot be ascribed to it at odds with the intentions
articulated in the statutes .... An insistence upon judicial regard
for the words of a statute does not imply that they are like words
in a dictionary to be read with no ranging of the mind. They are
no longer at rest in their alphabetical bins. Released, combined in
phrases that imperfectly communicate the thoughts of one man to
another, they challenge men to give them more than passive reading,
to consider well their context, to ponder what may be their conse-
quences. Speculation cuts brush with the pertinent question: what
purpose did the Legislature seek to express as it strung those words
into a statute? The court turns first to the words themselves for
the answer. It may also properly rely on extrinsic aids .... Pri-
marily, however, the words, in arrangement that superimposes the
purpose of the legislature upon their dictionary meaning stand in
95. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(d) (vest Supp. 1990). While the phrase "within existing
budgetary resources" was not before the Hochheiser court, this phrase only strengthens the
argument for a broad interpretation of section 288(d). See infra note 121.
96. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 790-791, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82.
97. Id. at 790, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
98. The court explained:
S.B. 506 [the bill enacting section 288(d)] mandates that in any prosecution for child
molestation the needs of the child to be protected from further psychological harm
during arrest and prosecution be placed on an equal priority with the successful
prosecution of the offender.
Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 791, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282 (citing SUMMARY oF 1981 CRIME
LEoisLATION REPORT at 17).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., People v. Perkins, 37 Cal. 2d 62, 64, 230 P.2d 353, 355 (1951).
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immobilized sentry, reminders that whether their arrangement was
wisdom or folly, it was wittingly under-taken and not to be disre-
garded.'01
This principle is found throughout California law. "Also, in ar-
riving at the meaning of a Constitution, 02 consideration must be
given to the words employed, giving every word, clause and sentence
their ordinary meaning. If doubts and ambiguities remain then, and
only then are we warranted in seeking elsewhere for aid."' 13 Ascer-
taining the plain meaning of a statute before using extrinsic legislative
aids is a practice with well-respected roots. 1' 4
Courts first look to the text to prevent themselves from giving
their own subjective evaluation of the motives behind legislation.
"The judgment of the court rests upon the ruling that another
purpose, not professed, may be read beneath the surface, and by the
purpose so imputed, the statute is destroyed. There is a wise and
ancient doctrine that a court will not inquire into the motives of a
legislative body."' 15 When courts use extrinsic aids to attempt to
discern the motives behind legislation, statutory interpretation be-
comes an increasingly subjective field that brings with it the threat
of judicial legislation. 1 1 When a court departs from the text of a
statute and substitutes a "legislative intent" that it gleans from
extrinsic sources, it substitutes its own views for that of the legisla-
ture.
The foremost embodiment of legislative intent is in the text of the
statute. The legislature, when approving a statute, approves the text,
not the legislative history. When the governor signs a bill, he signs
the text into law, not the debates, hearings or commissioner's com-
ments. When a statute is enacted it is reasonable to assume the
101. People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 182, 217 P.2d 1, 5 (1950) (emphasis added).
102. Principles that apply to construction of constitutions should also apply to statutory
construction. See Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 735, 755 P.2d 299, 303, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 115, 120 (1988).
103. State Board of Education v. Levit, 52 Cal. 2d 441, 462, 343 P.2d 8, 20 (1959)
(emphasis added). See, e.g., Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 735, 755 P.2d 299, 303-
04, 248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 120 (1988); People v. Craft, 41 Cal. 3d 554, 559-60, 715 P.2d 585,
588, 224 Cal. Rptr. 626, 629 (1986); In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 886, 694 P.2d 744, 752,
210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 639 (1985); Solberg v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 182, 198, 561 P.2d
1148, 1158, 137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 470 (1977).
104. "[While courts are no longer confined to the language [of the statute], they are still
confined by it. Violence must not be done to the words chosen by the Legislature." Frankfurter,
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLtrM. L. REv. 527, 543 (1948).
105. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
106. "We have no alternative but to resort to judicial construction, that is, to judicial
legislation." People v. Higgins, 87 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 938, 941, 197 P.2d 417, 419 (1948).
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legislature intended what was written into the text of the statute.
"After all, legislation when not expressed in technical terms is
addressed to the common run of men and is therefore to be under-
stood according to the sense of the thing as the ordinary man has a
right to rely on ordinary words addressed to him."'a7
The first task in interpreting section 288(d) is to determine whether
its words can be given a plain meaning. The majority of the text of
section 288(d) is relatively straightforward. °10 The most difficult part
of section 288(d) to interpret is the phrase "shall do whatever is
necessary and constitutionally permissible." The Hochheiser court
found that section 288(d) only stated a "mandate for philosophical
change."'' 9 This renders the operative phrase "shall do whatever is
necessary ... and constitutionally permissible" superfluous as the
phrase "shall consider the needs of the child victim" already gives
the philosophical position of the legislature.
The word "shall" is typically given either a mandatory or directory
reading by the courts. 110 The word "shall" is not always read to be
mandatory, but California courts frequently have given "shall" this
literal interpretation. In determining whether the word "shall" is
mandatory or directory, courts have tried to discern which reading
best fits the statute's purpose. "The entire statute may be resorted
to in order to ascertain its proper meaning. If to construe it as
directory would render it ineffective and meaningless, it should not
receive that construction.""'
A directory interpretation of section 288(d) would prevent it from
accomplishing its purpose. The purpose of section 288(d) is "to
prevent psychological harm to the victim.""12 If section 288(d) is
viewed as directory, courts have the option of doing nothing to help
the child victim. By giving "shall" a mandatory meaning, courts
must address the child molestation victim's problems. Obviously, it
will be easier to help child molestation victims if courts are required
107. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Co., 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944).
108. For the sake of convenience, the text of section 288(d) will be repeated: "In any
arrest or prosecution under this section or under section 288.5 the peace officer, the district
attorney and the court shall consider the needs of the child victim and shall do whatever is
necessary, within budgetary resources, and constitutionally permissible to prevent psychological
harm to the victim." CA. PENAL CODE § 288(d) (West Supp. 1990).
109. Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 791, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 282
(1984).
110. See, e.g., Jacobs v. State Bar, 20 Cal. 3d 191, 198, 570 P.2d 1230, 1233, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 812, 815 (1977).
111. Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 573, 203 P.2d 758, 764 (1949).
112. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(d) (West Supp. 1990).
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to help them instead of being given the option of doing nothing for
the children. "When the object is to subserve some public purpose,
the provision may be held directory or mandatory as will best
accomplish that purpose." ' 1 3 The construction of "shall" goes to the
heart of section 288(d). "In constructing a statute matters of sub-
stance are to be construed as mandatory."11 4
Giving "shall" a mandatory reading also aligns it with its com-
monly understood definition. Webster's dictionary defines "shall" as
expressing "determination, compulsion, obligation, or necessity in
the second or third person.""' 5 Black's Law Dictionary also gives
"shall" a mandatory definition.
As used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally
imperative or mandatory. In common or ordinary parlance, and in
its ordinary signification, the word shall is a word of command,
and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory
meaning; as denoting obligation." 6
Therefore, giving "shall" a mandatory meaning follows both the
common law and common sense. The phrase "whatever is necessary"
sets the scope of the duty imposed by "shall." Webster's dictionary
defines "whatever" as "anything that, [such] as, tell her whatever
you like.""17 Given the broad objective of section 288(d) to help child
molestation victims, "whatever" should be given its plain meaning.
The word "necessary," however, has been treated in different ways
by the courts. The common definition of "necessary" is restrictive.
"[Tihat cannot be dispensed with; essential; indispensable; as water
is necessary to life."" 8 Black's recognizes the different meanings
courts attach to "necessary:"
This word must be considered in the connection in which it is used
as it is a word susceptible of various meanings. It may import
absolute physical necessity or inevitability, or it may import that
which is only convenient, appropriate, suitable, proper or conducive
to the end sought. It is an adjective expressing degrees and may
express mere convenience or that which is indispensable or an
absolute physical necessity. 1" 9
113. Pulcifer v. County of Alameda, 29 Cal. 2d 258, 262, 175 P.2d 1, 3 (1946).
114. People v. Butler, 20 Cal. App. 379, 384, 129 P. 600, 602 (1912).
115. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DIcnoNARY UNABRIDGED 1666 (2d ed. 1983).
116. BLAcK's LAW DCTIONARY 1223 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
117. WEBSTER's NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 2081 (emphasis in
original).
118. Id. at 1200 (emphasis in original).
119. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 928 (5th ed. 1979).
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California courts also recognize the flexibility of the term "nec-
essary."' 120 Given the broad purpose behind 288(d) the more flexible
definition of "necessary" should be used. While it may be easy to
determine what is necessary to achieve some physical goal such as
"water is necessary to life," a child's psychological well-being, being
much more abstract, is therefore much more difficult to define
precisely than some physical objective. Therefore, "necessary" should
be given a flexible definition to match the inherently difficult to
define standard of "psychological harm to the victim. ' 121 Thus
"necessary" should be read to mean "suitable, proper, or conducive"
to give courts sufficient latitude to deal with the psychological harm
that can befall the child molestation victim.
Under section 288(d) courts are therefore under a duty to do
everything suitable to prevent psychological harm to the child mo-
lestation victim. The final question to answer in interpreting section
288(d) is the reach of this duty-what is "suitable" under section
288(d)? This question is answered by the phrase "and constitutionally
permissible." A court's duty under section 288(d) is only limited by
the constitution. Therefore, if a court's action does not violate a
defendant's United States or California constitutional rights or Cal-
ifornia's separation of powers doctrine,'22 the court's action is im-
mune from attack.
120. See Westphal v. Westphal, 122 Cal. App. 379, 382, 10 P.2d 119, 120 (1932); Danley
v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 66 Cal. App. 97, 105, 226 P. 847, 850 (1924).
121. The phrase "psychological harm to the victim," while addressing an inherently abstract
topic, the mental health of a child, does not render 288(d) so ambiguous that its plain meaning
cannot be determined. The key issue of section 288(d) as Hochheiser recognized, is whether
section 288(d) gives the courts additional authority to help child molestation victims. The
phrase "psychological harm to the victim," other than stating the goal of section 288(d), has
no bearing on the reach of the statute.
The phrase "within existing budgetary resources," added by the legislature in 1989, does
not justify the interpretation taken by the Hochheiser court. See 1989 Cal. Leg. Serv. ch.
1402, sec. 3, at 5256 (vest) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 288). By imposing a financial
limit for the expenditure or resources under this section, the legislature has indicated a belief
that some substantive action is expected under section 288(d). This further undercuts the
Hochheiser court's belief that section 288(d) only mandated a "philosophical change" as
philosophical changes do not cost money. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 791, 208 Cal.
Rptr. at 282. By providing for the expenditure of money, the legislature has noted that section
288(d) is meant to 'accomplish substantive goals such as providing for the appointment of
counsel for children.
As the phrase "within budgetary resources" was not contained in section 288(d) when
Hochheiser was decided, this new phrase also provides a means for distinguishing Hochheiser
from any use of section 288(d) under the new statute. As this phrase is only concerned with
the means provided to finance acts under section 288(d) it has no other direct bearing on a
court's power under section 288(d) to appoint counsel for the child for the fiscal effects of
the phrase "within existing budgetary resources." See infra note 231.
122. See CA. Co Nsr. art. V, § 13 (powers of the Attorney General).
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A court should refuse "to follow the plain meaning of a statute
only when it would inevitably have frustrated the manifest purpose
of the legislation as a whole or led to absurd results.' '1 23 Giving
section 288(d) its plain meaning would not frustrate the legislature's
plan, but would instead enhance it. It would give courts the power
to help child molestation victims, an end the legislature wanted to
achieve when it passed section 288(d). Giving courts the power to
aid child molestation victims does not lead to any absurd results.
There is nothing absurd in allowing courts to fashion curatives to
help some of the most vulnerable victims of crime.
In determining a statute's meaning, courts "are required to give
effect to statutes 'according to the usual, ordinary import of the
language employed in framing them."' 24 If the legislature only
wanted section 288(d) to "mandate a philosophical change focusing
on the minors needs,' '125 then it would have written section 288(d)
differently. Section 288(d) would then read:
It is the policy of the State of California that in any arrest or
prosecution under this section the peace officer, the district attorney
and the court ought to consider the psychological needs of the child
victim.
Courts recognize that different words have different meanings, and
that the legislature is aware of this when it writes statutes. 26 Thus,
if the legislature wanted section 288(d) to have the meaning Hoch-
heiser gave it, the legislature would have written section 288(d) to
look like the passage above. As the legislature did not do this, the
judiciary should not rewrite the section.
The chief constitutional objection that can be made to appointing
an attorney for victims of child molestation is that it violates the
separation of powers. The separation of powers doctrine is violated
when the district attorney's decision to institute criminal proceedings
is subject to the control of a private citizen. 127 The child's attorney
is not a private citizen appointed special prosecutor by a court. 2 8
123. People v. Belleci, 24 Cal. 3d 879, 884, 598 P.2d 473, 477, 157 Cal. Rptr. 503, 507
(1979).
124. Moyer v. Workmens's Compensation Appeal Board, 10 Cal. 3d 222, 230, 514 P.2d
1224, 1229, 110 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1973).
125. Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 791, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
126. See Hogya v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 122, 133, 142 Cal. Rptr. 325, 333
(1977) (the legislature recognizes the difference between "shall" and "may").
127. People v. Shults, 87 Cal. App. 3d 101, 106, 150 Cal. Rptr. 747, 750 (1978).
128. See People v. Municipal Court (Bishop), 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 207, 103 Cal. Rptr.
605, 656 (1972).
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His job is to minimize the damage the judicial process does to the
child, not decide whether charges are brought.
While it is not necessary to use legislative history to support this
reading of section 288(d), the legislative history of section 288(d)
provides support for a court's authority to appoint counsel for the
child. Before passing section 288(d), the legislature held extensive
hearings on the problem of child molestation and the failings of the
legal system in dealing with it.129 The Hochheiser court determined
that these hearings were unfavorable to support the use of closed-
circuit television under section 288(d), even though the use of closed-
circuit television was never mentioned during the hearing.130 Repre-
sentation for the victims was, however, mentioned several times
during the hearings.' While these usually addressed the need for
someone to advocate the child's position, at one point the testimony
did specifically mention the need for counsel for the victims. 3 2
The child molestation hearings support a much broader reading of
section 288(d) than the Hochheiser court gave it. Numerous references
were made to the trauma the legal process inflicts on molested
children. 33 As Senator Omer Rains, chairman of the Joint Committee
for Revision of the Penal Code stated:
California's laws in this area lag far behind other states which have
revised their laws to deal more efficiently and effectively with
persons who molest children. For example, there are no courtroom
procedures in California designed to lessen the psychological harm
done to the victim. The psychological effects on the victim caused
by present courtroom procedures and prosecution methods are
frequently every bit as serious and long lasting as the criminal act
itself. 34
Senator David Roberti also recognized the need to help child moles-
tation victims.
Studies indicate that both the initial molestation and the reliving of
it as the case goes through the criminal-justice [sic] process have
129. JOINT COMMITTEE FOR REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE, HEARING ON CHILD MOLESTATION,
December 16, 1980, April 10, 1981, April 24, 1981; ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
CHmLD MOLESTATION HEARING, November 12, 1980 [hereinafter to be referred to as CmLD
MOLESTATION HEARINGS].
130. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 790-91, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82.
131. See CHILD MOLESTATION HEARINGS, Nov. 12 at 78-79, 196-97; CHILD MOLESTATION
HEARINoS, Dec. 16 at 54.
132. CHILD MOLESTATION HEARINGS, Nov. 12 at 78-79.
133. See CiL MOLESTATION HEARINGS, Nov. 12 at 196-97; CHILD MOLESTATION HEARINGS,
Dec. 16 at 1-2, 53-54, 73, 86-87, Appendix D at 4; CHILD MOLESTATION HEARINGS, April 10
at 2, 19, 38, 56; CHILD MOLESTATION HEARINGS, April 24 at 2, 10, 37, 41, 78.
134. CHILD MOLESTATION HEARINGS, Apr. 10 at 2.
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long-range detrimental effects on the victim, yet much of the law
centers around the punishment and rehabilitation of the offender.
Is enough attention being given to the needs of the victim?135
As the Hochheiser court recognized, the hearings considered many
different techniques for lessening the psychological harm to the
victim. These techniques included "videotaping procedures to avoid
victims having to repeat their testimony, strictly prohibiting contin-
uances, closing hearings, providing for the attendance of a supporting
parent, and limiting the kind of questioning and voir dire."'13 6 The
legislature was both acutely concerned with the problems of child
molestation victims and aware of a broad spectrum of techniques
that could lessen the harm the system did to the children. Section
288(d) was the legislature's response to this. In response to these
problems facing the victims of child molestation, the legislature
enacted section 288(d) and gave the courts the ability to engage in a
variety of measures to help meet the many different needs of child
molestation victims.
Hochheiser also attacks the ameliorative purpose of section 288(d)
by citing subsequent legislative efforts to help child molestation
victims. 37 Hochheiser's emphasis on subsequent legislative acts is
misplaced, however, as the relevant legislative intent is the intent of
the legislature that enacted the statute. Subsequent legislation cannot
change the plain meaning or legislative history of section 288(d)
without amending it. As no such amendment has been made, the
original interpretation of section 288(d) is still valid.
The Hochheiser court had two final justifications for narrowly
construing section 288(d). The first, that it should not construe a
statute to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such
intention is clearly shown,3 8 is inapplicable, as the appointment of
counsel is not a new principle. Appointed counsel is a well-established
procedure in criminal cases. 39 Furthermore, in California appointed
counsel is particularly common in proceedings involving children. 4 0
Thus appointing counsel does not overthrow any long-established
principles that the Hochheiser court wanted to protect.
135. CHmD MOLESTATION HEARGS, Dec. 16 at 1-2.
136. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 791 n.9, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282 n.9.
137. Id. at 791, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
138. Id. at 791-92, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
139. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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The second reason is the rule of construction that penal statutes
are to be construed in favor of the defendant.14  This rule of
construction, however, is only applicable when the language is sus-
ceptible to more than one construction. 142 Furthermore, "that rule
will not be applied to change manifest, reasonable legislative pur-
pose.' 1 43 This rule is only a tool of construction. It cannot be invoked
where the statute is unambiguous. "The rule comes into operation
at the end of the process of construing what Congress had expressed,
not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient
to wrong-doers. That is not the function of the judiciary."' 44 The
Hochheiser court did not come up with any reasonable alternative
to the plain meaning of section 288(d)-that a court must do anything
practical that is not constitutionally forbidden to help protect the
child molestation victim from any further psychological harm as the
result of a prosecution under section 288. "[T]he canon entitles
defendant only to the benefit of every realistic doubt. This rule of
construction 'is not an inexorable command to override common
sense and evident statutory purpose." ' 45 There is no realistic doubt
to justify veering from the plain meaning of section 288(d).
The Hochheiser court was concerned with a possible violation of
defendant's constitutional rights when it interpreted section 288(d). 46
While this may explain the Hochheiser court's narrow construction
of section 288(d), it does not justify such a narrow construction. The
Hochheiser court, in its zeal to protect defendant ignored the primary
source of a statute's meaning - the text of the statute. 47 A thorough
examination of the text of section 288(d) shows that the statute gives
courts a broad grant of power to help molested children through the
ordeal of the child molestation prosecution. 48
141. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 792, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
142. See id.
143. People v. Banks, 53 Cal. 2d 370, 391, 348 P.2d 102, 116, 1 Cal. Rptr. 669, 683
(1959).
144. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961).
145. People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1145-46, 742 P.2d 1306, 1330, 240 Cal. Rptr.
585, 609 (1987) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Brown, 338 U.S. 18, 25
(1948)). As Justice Black stated:
No rule of construction, however, requires that a penal statute be strained and
distorted in order to exclude conduct clearly intended to be within its scope-nor
does any rule require that the act be given the "narrowest meaning." It is sufficient
if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the evident intent of
Congress.
United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 552 (1938).
146. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text.
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"There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose
of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to
give expression to its wishes.' 1 49 This principle, not the various
rationales offered by the Hochheiser court, should be followed to
allow section 288(d) to do what the legislature intended it to accom-
plish-help the molested child through the ordeal of the criminal
prosecution.
II. PREVENTING DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM TALKING TO THE VICTIMS
A. Rule 2-100
An attorney for the child molestation victim has many means to
minimize the trauma of legal proceedings. ,50 One of the most effective
techniques to protect the child witness would be for the child's
attorney to bar defense counsel from having any contact with the
victim without the consent of the child's attorney. The child's counsel
could then limit the number of times a child would have to repeat
his story and prevent unnecessary encounters between the child and
potentially hostile attorneys.
Among the greatest burdens a molested child must bear is the
burden of having to incessantly repeat the story of his molestation
to other people. In addition to making the initial complaint, usually
to "a trusted friend, non-abusing parent, counselor or teacher,""'
the child must go through an odyssey of retelling his experiences
over and over again. First, he usually must "relate, in vivid detail,
the specifics of the sexual encounter" to a police officer. 112 Then he
will be transported to the local emergency room for physical exam-
ination, where he "is confronted with more strangers and the setting
in all too many cases is a frightening environment." '153 In this setting
he may again be required to retell his story.5 4 Next, he will be
interviewed by the detectives and district attorney(s) assigned to his
149. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
150. See, e.g., CAL. ATToRNEY GENERAL, CAtuOa iRA CmD VIcTIM WITNESS JUDICIAL
ADVISORY ComMrrrEE 69 n.5 (1988). See also infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
151. Avery, supra note 15, at 14.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 15.
154. Id.
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case to determine the strength of his case.1 5 This may also involve
a polygraph examination.Y6 If the district attorney decides to pros-
ecute, the child, as the main witness, will have to testify at the
preliminary hearing, and, if necessary, the trial.1-7
In addition to all of these interviews, the unrepresented child will
frequently be interviewed by defendant's counsel. While the victim
is under no obligation to talk to defense counsel, the uninformed
victim is likely to be unaware that he does not have to talk to defense
counsel.' 58 The attorney for the child, in addition to informing the
child and his guardian about his right to refuse to talk to defense
counsel 5 9 can also prevent defense counsel from contacting the victim
by virtue of the attorney-client relationship between the victim and
his counsel.
Rule 2-100 subdivision (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
of the State Bar of California' 60 provides that
while representing a client, a member shall not communicate directly
or indirectly about the subject of the representation with a party
the member knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the member has the consent of the other lawyer.
The purpose of this rule is preserving the attorney-client relationship.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 1, at 125.
158. See People v. Municipal Court (Runyon), 20 Cal. 3d 523, 531, 574 P.2d 425, 429,
143 Cal. Rptr. 609, 613 (1978); People v. Mersino, 237 Cal. App. 2d 265, 269, 46 Cal. Rptr.
821, 824 (1965) (defendant has no right to depose witnesses).
159. The district attorney would have a much more difficult time telling the victim that he
did not have to talk to defense counsel. See People v. Hannon, 19 Cal. 3d 588, 601, 564 P.2d
1203, 1211, 138 Cal. Rptr. 885, 892-93 (1977) (state cannot tell witness not to talk to defense
counsel).
160. CAL. Civ. & CPs. R., PROF. CONDUCT 2-100 (West Interim Annot. Serv. No. 1
1989). The predecessor of Rule 2-100 was Rule 7-103 which provided that:
[a] member of the State Bar shall not communicate directly or indirectly with a
party whom he knows to be represented by counsel upon a subject of controversy,
without the express consent of such counsel. This rule shall not apply to commu-
nications with a public officer, board, committee or body.
CAL. Civ. & CIuM. R., PROF. CONDUCT 7-103 (West Supp. 1989) (repealed). This Article also
will discuss several ethical rules promulgated by the American Bar Association. The Model
Code of Professional Responsibility is based upon ethical considerations ("EC") and discipli-
nary rules ("DR"). The ethical considerations "are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives towards which every member should strive." AsmucAN BAR FOUNDATiON, ANNo-
TATED CODE OF PROFESSIoNAL REsPONsmiLrrY 3 (1979). The disciplinary rules, however, "state
the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action." Id. Thus, the Ethical Considerations can be seen as providing interpretive
guidance to the Disciplinary Rules. Id. at 4. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct designed
to replace the Model Code of Professional Responsibility do not have any Ethical Consider-
ations. They consists only of rules, with comments to each rule indicating the drafters' intent.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
This rule [former Rule 12] is necessary to the preservation of the
attorney-client relationship and the proper functioning of the ad-
ministration of justice .... It shields the opposing party not only
from an attorney's approaches which are intentionally improper,
but, in addition, from approaches, which are well intended but
misguided.
The rule was designed to permit an attorney to function adequately
in his proper role and to prevent the opposing attorney from
impeding his performance in such role. If a party's counsel is
present when an opposing attorney communicates with a party,
counsel can easily correct any element of error in the communication
or correct the effect of the communication by calling attention to
counteracting elements which may exist. 161
The key to determining whether the relationship between the mo-
lested child and his appointed counsel is protected by Rule 2-100 is
determining if the victim of a crime is a "party" within the meaning
of Rule 2-100. If the child is a party under Rule 2-100, then his
relationship with his attorney will be protected, and his attorney will
be able to invoke the rule to insulate the child from the unwanted
attention of defense counsel.
The objection that would be made against this use of Rule 2-100
is that the term "party" under Rule 2-100 is limited to the parties
to the action. This objection, however, understates the reach of Rule
2-100 as it fails to appreciate the intent behind Rule 2-100. Califor-
nia's Penal Code defines the formal parties to the criminal case.
Section 684 of the Penal Code states that "[a] criminal action is
prosecuted in the name of the people of the state of California, as
a party, against the person charged with the offense,"' 62 and Section
685 provides that "[t]he party prosecuted in a criminal action is
designated in this code as the defendant. ' 163 These do not, however,
provide much help in determining the definition of "party" for Rule
2-100. The comment to Rule 2-100 specifically states that the term
"party" is not limited to its litigation context. "As used in subpar-
agraph (a) [of Rule 2-100] 'the subject of representation,' 'matter,'
and 'party' are not limited to a litigation context."' 64 Thus, these
Penal Code sections cannot address the reach of Rule 2-100.
161. Mitton v. State Bar, 71 Cal. 2d 525, 534, 455 P.2d 753, 758, 78 Cal. Rptr. 649, 654
(1969).
162. CAL. PENAL CODE § 684 (West 1985).
163. Id. § 685 (West 1985).
164. Rule 2-100, comment (WNest Interim Annot. Serv. No. 1, 1989). This interpretation
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The cases are similarly unenlightening. In People v. Jung Qung
Sung,65 the California Supreme Court determined that the parties to
a criminal action were the people and the defendant.166 But the court
only needed to define the minimum extent of "parties" to hold that
defendant was present throughout the trial when the trial record only
stated that "the parties" were present throughout the trial. 167
The only case that addressed the question of who is a "party"
within the meaning of Rule 2-100 is Kain v. Municipal Court.168 In
Kain, the defendant attempted to disqualify the entire district attor-
ney's office from his prosecution for molesting his daughters, as the
office at the same time was representing the children in the depend-
ency action against defendant. 69 The court of appeal did not accept
defendant's argument that Rule 7-103 170 would prevent his counsel
from communicating with the children concerning defendant's crim-
inal prosecution. The court summarily rejected this argument, stating
that the victims are not parties to a criminal action under Rule 7-
103.1'
Kain, however, does not prevent attorneys for child molestation
victims from invoking Rule 2-100 to protect their clients because
of Rule 2-100 does not contradict this Article's textual interpretation of section 288(d). The
comment which shows the ambiguity of the term "party," is very closely related to the text
of rule 2-100. In the code containing rule 2-100, the comment immediately follows rule 2-100.
See CAL. Civ. & CRiu. R. PROF. CONDUCT 2-100 comment (West Interim Annot. Serv. No. 1
1989). As the comment is literally on the same page as the text of Rule 2-100, it should be
given substantial weight in interpreting Rule 2-100. This stands in contrast to the legislative
materials used by the Hochheiser court in interpreting section 288(d) which were not included
anywhere near the text of section 288(d). See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. Thus,
the drafters of Rule 2-100, by including the comment with Rule 2-100, introduced the ambiguity
into Rule 2-100 for all people to see. Therefore an interpretation of Rule 2-100 based on the
comment does not contradict the text of the Rule 2-100 because the comment is effectively a
part of the text of Rule 2-100.
165. 70 Cal. 469, 11 P. 755 (1886).
166. Id. at 472, 11 P. at 757.
167. Id. See also Oppenheimer v. Clifton's Brookdale, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 403, 220
P.2d 422 (1950). In Oppenheimer, the court found that bribery of a police officer was a public
offense and therefore could only be prosecuted in the name of the people. Id. at 404, 220
P.2d at 423. Oppenheimer, however, concerned the institution of a civil action, and whether
alleging bribery of a public official was sufficient to state a cause of action. Oppenheimer did
not determine who constituted the parties to a criminal case and thus is not applicable to
determining the scope of Rule 2-100. Id. at 405, 220 P.2d at 423.
168. 130 Cal. App. 3d 499, 181 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1982).
169. Id. at 98 Cal. App. 2d at 501-02, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
170. The predecessor of Rule 2-100 was Rule 7-103 which provided that:
[a] member of the State Bar shall not communicate directly or indirectly with a
party whom he knows to be represented by counsel upon a subject of controversy,
without the express consent of such counsel. This rule shall not apply to commu-
nications with a public officer, board, committee or body.
CAL. Crv. & CRiM. R., PROF. CoNDucT 7-103 (West Supp. 1989) (repealed).
171. Kain, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 504, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 753-54.
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Kain involved two different attorney-client relationships. The attor-
ney-client relationship between the district attorney's office and the
children in Kain arises from the dependency action. 72 The dependency
action is commenced under section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code, and its purpose is "to protect and promote the welfare of the
child, not to punish the parent. 1' 73 The purpose of criminal law,
however, is concerned with the punishment of defendant. 7 4 While
the district attorney, as public prosecutor, may want to see that the
child's best interests are served, his duty as public prosecutor is to
see that the defendant is punished for his crimes. 75 Thus, as each
has a different interest in the criminal action, the children have no
attorney-client relationship with the district attorney's office in its
role as public prosecutor. 76 Furthermore, the prosecutor already has
a client in the criminal action, the people of California. 77 Therefore,
as the district attorney is not the attorney for the molested children
in a criminal action, he does not have standing to invoke Rule 2-100
to protect the children. 7 Thus, Kain can be distinguished because
the Kain court did not deal with an attorney appointed to represent
the children in the criminal case.
The Drafters' Comments present the best evidence of who is a
party within the meaning of Rule 2-100. In addition to stating that
the term "party" is not to be used in its litigation context, 79 the
Drafters' Comments also show the intent behind the rule. "Rule 2-
100 is intended to control communications between a member and
persons the member knows to be represented by counsel .... 0
The word "party" is conspicuously absent from this part of the
Drafters' Comments. This indicates that Rule 2-100 is intended to
172. See id. at 501, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
173. Collins v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 47, 52, 141 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (1977).
174. See HALL, GENERA PRINCIPLES OF CRMINAL LAW 18 (2d ed. 1960).
175. See CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13; City of Merced v. County of Merced, 240 Cal. App.
2d 763, 766, 50 Cal. Rptr. 287, 289 (1966).
176. See CAL. Civ. & CRim. R., PROF. CONDUCT 3-310 (West Interim Annot. Serv. No. 1
1989) (representation of adverse interests).
177. See supra note 175.
178. California Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 2-100 states in relevant part:
[w]hile representing a client, a member shall not communicate directly or indirectly
about the subject of the representation with a party the member knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the member has the consent of
the other lawyer.
CAL. Civ. & CRam. R., PROF. CONDUCT 2-100 (West Interim Annot. Serv. No. 1 1989).
179. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
180. CAL. Civ. & Cum. R., PROF. CONDUCT 2-100 comment (West Interim Annot. Serv.
No. 1 1989).
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cover more than the formal parties to the litigation. Instead, as the
Drafters' Comments suggest, it should cover any person who has
retained counsel regarding a matter, regardless of whether that person
is a formal party to any litigation.
This reading of Rule 2-100 follows the standards set by the
American Bar Association. EC 7-18 provides that
[t]he legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons
in need of legal advice or assistance are represented by their own
counsel. For this reason a lawyer should not communicate on the
subject matter of the representation of his client with a person he
knows to be represented in the matter by a lawyer, unless pursuant
to law ... or unless he has the consent of the lawyer for that
person.'8 '
EC 7-18 demonstrates the purpose behind the rule against com-
munication with represented persons. If someone is represented by
counsel regarding a matter, that person's relationship with his attor-
ney should be respected regardless of the client's status in litigation,
if any, and no other attorney should interfere with it without the
client's attorney's consent.
The newer Model Rules of Professional Conduct agree. Model
Rule 4.2 provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do S.182
The comment to this rule shows the broad meaning that should
be given to the term "party." "This rule covers any person, whether
or not a party to a formal proceeding, who is represented by counsel
concerning the matter in question."18 The comment to rule 4.2 gives
the proper definition of party for Rule 2-100. "Party" must mean
more than the formal parties to litigation. 84 Extending the definition
of party to include anyone who is represented by counsel concerning
the matter in question advances the goal of Rule 2-100 of preserving
the attorney-client relationship while at the same time allowing at-
torneys to speak with represented people on matters outside the
representation. "This Rule does not prohibit communication with a
181. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-18 (1980). See supra note 160,
for the differences between an ethical consideration "EC" and the disciplinary rule "DR."
182. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL Co UCT Rule 4.2 (1983).
183. Id. Rule 4.2 comment (emphasis added).
184. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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party, or an employee or agent of a party, concerning matters outside
the representation. ' 18 5
The ABA's third pronouncement on this subject, DR 7-104(A) is
less certain.
DR 7-104 Communication With One of Adverse Interest. (A) During
the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject
of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a
lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so. 8 6
The Textual and Historical Notes provide no additional informa-
tion regarding the intention of the drafter's in using the term
"party. s18 7 Given the similarity between rule 4.2 and DR 7-104
(a)(1) 88 and that rule 4.2 has a drafter's comment, while DR 7-
104(a)(1) has no statement of the drafter's intent, there is no reason
to interpret DR 7-104(A)(1) any differently. 89
The broad definition of party also has academic support.
Both DR 7-104(A)(1) and MR 4.2 prohibit contact with a represented
"pary." The lawyerism party sometimes refers only to parties in
litigation but evidently is here intended to refer broadly to any
"person" represented by a lawyer in a matter. Vide 'party of the
first part' in ancient contracts.'1°
This view is taken as a given by some in the field of continuing legal
education. "Witnesses in a criminal case who testify for the prose-
cution are not considered to be represented by the prosecutor and
may be directly approached by defense counsel unless they are
represented by another attorney concerning their testimony in that
case." 9'
Allowing people other than the formal parties to the litigation to
be protected by Rule 2-100 makes good law and good sense. The
purpose of the rule is not just to insure that neither side of a
litigation gains unfair advantage over the other; it is also designed
to preserve the attorney-client relationship. "[T]he ultimate purpose
of [then] Rule 7-103 is to preserve the confidentiality of attorney-
185. MODEL RUmES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1983).
186. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNssmrry DR 7-104(A)(1). See supra note 160,
for the differences between ethical consideration "EC" and disciplinary rule "DR."
187. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmi=rry DR-104(A)(1).
188. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 4.2 (1983).
189. See WOLFRAm, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 11.6.2, at 611 (1986).
190. Id. at 611 n.33 (emphasis in original).
191. BuRR & FEFFER, PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION OF CASE AND ARGUMENT IN CALI-
FORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 29.9, at 596 (Cal. Cont. Ed. of the Bar 1986).
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client communications."'' 92 Extending Rule 2-100 beyond the formal
parties to the litigation will help preserve the attorney-client relation-
ship wherever it is threatened by unwarranted communication from
another attorney.
The relationship between the molested child and his appointed
counsel is the type of attorney-client relatibnship 'that should be
protected under Rule 2-100 from unwarranted intrusions from defense
counsel. Counsel is appointed for the child to minimize the psycho-
logical trauma a prosecution under section 288 can do to the child. 93
Defense counsel, by interviewing the child, adds to the harm done
to the child by forcing him to retell the story of his molestation. 94
Thus, defense counsel, when interviewing the child without the con-
sent of the child's attorney, strikes at the heart of the child's attorney-
client relationship. The reason behind appointing counsel for the
child is to minimize the psychological harm done to the child by the
legal system. 195 Given the great vulnerability of children, especially
when victims of molestation,1 96 it is particularly important that Rule
2-100 protect the relationship between the molested child and his
attorney. While the attorney-client relationship is always important,
it takes on extra meaning when the fragile psyche of the molested
child is involved.
B. The Constitutionality of Using Rule 2-100
When an attorney for a molested child uses Rule 2-100 to prevent
defense counsel from interviewing the child, a firestorm of protest
192. Bobele v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 3d 708, 712, 245 Cal. Rptr. 144, 146 (1988).
193. See supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text. One cost of unnecessary contact
between the child and defense counsel could be the child's testimony at trial. A child could
be willing to retell his story only a limited number of times. Therefore, interviews with defense
counsel could be the proverbial "last straw" and make the child unwilling to testify. See
Mlyniec & Dally, supra note 32, at 137.
195. The district attorney should be equally susceptible to Rule 2-100. The comment states
that "[t]here are a number of express statutory schemes which authorize communications
between a member, and person who would otherwise be subject to this rule . . . . Other
applicable law includes the authority of government prosecutors and investigators as limited
by relevant decisional law." CAL. Civ. & Canm. R., PROF. CONDUCT 2-100 comment (West
Interim Annot. Serv. No. 1, 1989). If the prosecutor wants to interview the child and the
child's attorney refuses, then the prosecutor will have to subpoena the child and have the child
testify before the grand jury. CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.2 (West Supp. 1989). The child's
attorney must determine whether the child's psychological interests are best served either by
testifying before the grand jury or by being interviewed by the district attorney subject to
whatever conditions that can be agreed upon between the district attorney and the child's
attorney.
196. See supra notes 15-36 and accompanying text.
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from defense counsel will inevitably ensue. Protests from defense
counsel should not, however, prevent the child's attorney from
limiting access to his client, nor should it prevent courts from
upholding such decisions, as there is nothing in either the United
States or California constitutions to prohibit the child's counsel from
restricting defense counsel's access to the child.
1. Confrontation
Preventing defense counsel from interviewing the child will not
deny defendant his right to confront witnesses against him.197 The
right to confrontation is not a right to pretrial discovery. "The right
to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the op-
portunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh
the demeanor of the witness."' 198 The purpose of the confrontation
right is not to give defendant carte blanche in preparing for his trial.
"The primary object of [the confrontation clause] was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being used against prisoner in
lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the wit-
ness." 199 Therefore, as long as the defendant is allowed to confront
and cross-examine the child at trial,200 his confrontation rights are
not violated. "It was clear ... that the 'confrontation' guaranteed
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is confrontation at trial-
that is the absence of defendant at the time the codefendant allegedly
made the out-of-court statement is immaterial, so long as the de-
clarant can be cross-examined on the witness stand at trial.''201
Therefore, as long as defendant is not prevented from cross-exam-
ining defendant at trial there will be no violation of his rights to
confrontation. 20 2
197. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
198. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
199. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). Using Rule 2-100 to prevent
defense counsel from interviewing the child outside of court will not prevent the early dismissal
of meritless cases. The preliminary hearing is the vehicle designed to weed out meritless cases.
"The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to weed out groundless or unsupported charges of
grave offenses." People v. Eliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498, 504, 354 P.2d 225, 229, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753,
757 (1960). Thus, as long as defendant can cross-examine the child at the preliminary hearing,
defendant should be safe from meritless cases.
200. See People v. Harris, 165 Cal. App. 3d 1246, 1256, 212 Cal. Rptr. 216, 221-22 (1985)
(defendant entitled to confrontation at the preliminary hearing).
201. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 626 (1971).
202. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), a plurality of the court found that
the confrontation clause was only a trial right. Id. at 53-54. While three justices opposed this
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2. Adequate Defense
Allowing the child's counsel to invoke Rule 2-100 also would not
violate defendant's right to prepare an adequate defense. The pros-
ecution has a duty not to suppress evidence favorable to the ac-
cused. 203 Furthermore, the prosecution cannot order a potential witness
to refuse to speak to defendant's attorney.2=° Thus, if appointing
counsel for the child is perceived as a government ploy to deprive
the defendant of a chance to interview the witness, then the child's
attorney's use of Rule 2-100 could be described as an intentional
suppression by the government of whatever evidence defendant would
get from interviewing the child.
a. Sufficient Preparation
A defendant is not prevented from interviewing the child because
defendant already has an opportunity to interview the child before
trial at the preliminary hearing. While the primary function of the
preliminary hearing is to "weed out groundless or unsupported
charges of grave offenses, and to relieve the accused of the degra-
dation and expense of a criminal trial, ' 20 the preliminary hearing
can also serve as an important discovery tool for defendant. In
Hawkins v. Superior Court,206 the California Supreme Court recog-
nized the important discovery function an adversarial preliminary
hearing can play.20 7 The Hawkins court recognized that one of the
most important advantages given to defendants in preliminary hear-
holding, id. at 61 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
66 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting), two other justices did not address the confron-
tation clause issue, dissenting on the grounds that the case lacked finality. Id. at 72 (Stevens,
J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting). While California courts have been
willing to extend defendant's confrontation right to the preliminary hearing, defendant will
still be able to confront the child at the preliminary examination and trial, preserving his right
to confrontation under the California Constitution (art. I, section 15). See, e.g., People v.
Harris, 165 Cal. App. 3d 1246, 1256, 212 Cal. Rptr. 216, 221-22 (1985) (confrontation right
extends to preliminary hearing). Finally, the state right to confrontation may be the same as
the federal right. People v. Contreras, 57 Cal. App. 3d 816, 820, 129 Cal. Rptr. 397, 399
(1976).
203. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
204. Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 140, 317 P.2d 130, 134 (1957).
205. Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150, 114 P.2d 335, 338 (1941).
206. 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978).
207. Id. at 588, 586 P.2d at 918-19, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 437-438.
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ings was the ability it gave defense counsel to elicit information from
hostile prosecution witnesses.
There is no other effective means [than the preliminary examination]
for the defense to compel the cooperation of a hostile witness
[citation]; in the unlikely event that all the prosecution witnesses
agree to submit to defense interviews, the defense still must incur
unnecessary expense and hardship which may be substantial. 208
The United States Supreme Court also recognized defendant's ability
to interview hostile witnesses at the preliminary examination.
First, the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination of
witnesses [at the preliminary hearing] may expose fatal weaknesses
in the State's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind
the accused over. Second, in any event the skilled interrogation of
witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment
tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the trial
.... Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover the case
the State has against his client and make possible the preparation
of a proper defense to meet that case at trial.2 9
Under California law, the defendant has the right to cross-examine
prosecution witnesses210 and to call witnesses on his own behalf at
the preliminary hearing. 211 Given the importance of the victim's
testimony to the typical child molestation case, 2 2 the prosecution will
usually have the child testify at the preliminary examination and
therefore leave him open to cross-examination by defense counsel.
This cross-examination may be for the purpose of raising an affir-
mative defense2 3 or to impeach the witness. 2 4 Furthermore "[iut is
not a valid objection that the examination may lead to discovery...
or that the cross-examiner is unable to predict what the testimony
will develop. ' 21 5 Given the latitude defendant has in cross-examina-
tion he should have little difficulty in conducting a thorough exam-
ination of the child at the preliminary hearing. If the prosecution
decides not to call the child at the preliminary hearing then defendant
can call the child as a defense witness and can examine him with
208. Id. at 589, 586 P.2d at 919, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
209. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (plurality opinion).
210. CAL. PENAL CODE § 865 (West 1985).
211. CAL, PENAL CODE § 866 (West 1985).
212. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
213. Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 877-78, 428 P.2d 304, 311, 59 Cal. Rptr.
440, 447 (1967).
214. Alford v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 724, 728, 105 Cal. Rptr. 713, 715-16
(1972).
215. Foster v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 3d 218, 225, 165 Cal. Rptr. 701, 705 (1980).
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similar thoroughness. 21 6 The defendant's right to a preliminary hear-
ing,217 when combined with the broad scope that defense counsel's
questioning can take at the preliminary hearing, satisfies whatever
right defendant has to interview witnesses to prepare for his de-
fense. 2 18
b. No State Action
In addition to not depriving the defendant of any rights, invoking
Rule 2-100 survives constitutional scrutiny because the child's attor-
ney's actions cannot be fairly attributed to the state. "[M]ost rights
secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement
by governments. ' 21 9 The defendant's confrontation right and his right
to prepare a defense, to the extent they are derived from the United
States Constitution, come from the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.220 As the fourteenth amendment only applies
to state actions, not the actions of private individuals, 221 the attorney's
action in invoking Rule 2-100 must in some way be attributed to the
state for it to violate defendant's federal constitutional rights.'
216. See McDaniel v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. App. 3d 803, 805, 126 Cal. Rptr. 136, 137
(1976) (applying the principles of Jennings to direct examination by defendant at the preliminary
hearing).
217. Hawkins, 22 Cal. 3d at 593, 586 P.2d at 922, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
218. Cf., Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 317 P.2d 130 (1957). In
Walker, the defendant was indicted by a grand jury. Id. at 139, 317 P.2d at 134. While the
court did not mention whether a preliminary hearing had taken place, as it was 20 years
before defendant had a right to a post-indictment preliminary hearing, Hawkins, 22 Cal. 3d
at 593, 586 P.2d at 922, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 441, it is logical to assume that the defendant in
Walker had no preliminary hearing to give him the opportunity to examine the witness. Walker
is based on defendant's right to "obtain witnesses to testify on his behalf and to prepare a
defense." People v. Hannon, 19 Cal. 3d 588, 601, 564 P.2d 1203, 1210-11, 138 Cal. Rptr.
885, 892-893 (1977). This right is amply protected by defendant's ability to examine the child
at the preliminary hearing.
219. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).
220. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
86 (1963).
221. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 799 (1966).
222. California also requires state action to invoke its constitution. California's equal
protection and due process provisions both require state action. CAL. Co NsT. art. I, §§ 7, 15.
Gay Law Students' Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 467-69, 595 P.2d 592,
597-598, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 19-20 (1979) (equal protection); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11
Cal. 3d 352, 366-67, 521 P.2d 441, 449-450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449, 457-458 (1974) (due process).
No California case discusses the relationship between state action and California's confrontation
clause, California Constitution article I, section 15. As California's confrontation clause is in
the same part of the constitution as California's due process clause, which does require state
action, there is no reason not to require state action for California's confrontation clause.
The confrontation clause's concern with criminal matters provides all the more reason to limit
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Therefore, for any constitutional issue to be raised by the use of
Rule 2-100 by the child's attorney, the actions of the child's attorney
in using Rule 2-100 must in some way be attributed to the state.
When analyzing whether a person's actions can be attributed to
the state, the key issue is whether the private actor exercises powers
that are usually reserved to the state.223 If the private actor exercises
"power traditionally exclusively reserved to the State" such as elec-
tions or running towns, then these actions can be considered state
actions.224 The powers of the attorney are by no means exclusively
reserved to the state. 225
The public importance and heavy regulation of the practice of law
does not make it a state function. "Doctors, optometrists, lawyers,
Metropolitan [Edison Company], and Nebbia's Upstate New York
Grocery selling a quart of milk are all engaged in regulated businesses
providing arguably essential goods and services 'affected with a public
interest.' We do not believe that such a status converts their every
action, absent more, into that of the State.' '226
California's enactment of Rule 2-100 into law does not turn the
child's attorney's use of Rule 2-100 into state action. A state must
compel the action of a private actor to be responsible for the act.2 27
California, in enacting Rule 2-100, does not compel an attorney to
use it to prevent contact between his client and another attorney.
Indeed, under certain circumstances the child's attorney may want
to let the defendant's attorney talk to the child.228 It is up to the
attorney, not the state, to decide whether the client can speak to
another attorney about the subject of the representation. 29 "Some-
its prohibitions to state action. See Dyas v. Superior Court, I 1 Cal. 3d 628, 632, 522 P.2d
674, 676, 114 Cal. Rptr. 114, 116 (1974) (California's exclusionary rule does not apply to the
actions of private citizens). While the California Supreme Court has defined state action
differently from the United States Supreme Court on occasion, it has done so in the heavily
regulated area of public utilities. See King v. Meese, 43 Cal. 3d 1217, 1229, 743 P.2d 889,
896, 240 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836-837 (1987); Gay Law Students Ass'n, 24 Cal. 3d at 469, 595
P.2d at 598-99, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21. Since the attorney's use of Rule 2-100 does not
involve such a situation, there is no reason to include the use of Rule 2-100 in a broader
definition of state action than the federal courts use.
223. See 2 RoTuNDA, NowAK, & YoUNG, TREArsE ON CoNsrTTunoAL LAW § 16.2, at
163 (1986).
224. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
225. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060 (West Supp. 1989) (qualifications for
admission to California State Bar).
226. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354.
227. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 164.
228. See SMIrrH, CHILDREN'S STORY: CHDREN IN CRIMINAL COURT 43 (1985).
229. "While representing a client, a member shall not communicate directly or indirectly
about the subject of the representation with a party the member knows to be represented by
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one's exercise of the choice allowed by state law where the initiative
comes from [him] and not from the state does not make [his] action
in doing so 'state action' for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 30
The closest relationship the child's attorney has with the state is
in his appointment by the court under section 288(d) and whatever
compensation, if any, he receives from California. While this article
has not discussed whether and how the child's attorney is to be
compensated for his services, it is possible that, like appointed counsel
for indigent criminal defendants, the attorney appointed under section
288(d) could be paid by the government.2' Even if the child's attorney
is paid by the state or any subdivision of the state,2 2 this does not
make the state responsible for his actions. "The Government may
subsidize private entities without assuming constitutional responsibil-
ity for their actions.'' 33
another lawyer in the matter, unless the member has the consent of the other lawyer." CAL.
CIV. & CRIsM. R., PROF. CoNDUCT 2-100 (West Interim Annot. Serv. No. 1, 1989).
230. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354 (footnote omitted). Thus California does not encourage the
child's attorney to prevent defense counsel from interviewing the child. Rule 2-100 is a neutral
statement that allows any attorney to prevent an opposing attorney from talking to his client.
"The existence of a state law which recognizes the legitimacy of an action taken by an
otherwise private person will not give rise to 'state action' being present in the private activity.
To imbue an activity with state action there must be some non-neutral involvement of the
state with the activity." RoTUNDA, NowAK, & YOUNG, supra note 223, § 16.3 at 176. Therefore
it is the child's attorney, not California, that keeps defense counsel away from the child.
231. The first place to start in determining how to finance the appointment of counsel
under section 288(d) is with the phrase "within existing budgetary resources." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 288(d) (West Supp. 1990). As this Article is concerned with the extent of a court's
authority under section 288(d) and not the interpretation of financing provisions of statutes,
a detailed analysis of the phrase "within existing budgetary resources" will not be provided.
The legislative counsel believes that the inclusion of the phrase "within existing budgetary
resources" into section 288(d) makes section 288(d) a state-mandated local program. 1989. Cal.
Leg. Serv. ch. 1402, at 5253 (West) (legislative counsel's digest). Article XIII B, section 6 of
the California Constitution requests that the state provide a "subvention of funds" to local
governments whenever "the legislature or any other state agency mandates a new program or
higher level of service on any local government." CAL. CorsT. art. XIII B, § 6 (West Supp.
1989). Therefore, the county could pay the cost of the child's counsel and seek reimbursement
from the state. By adding the clause "within existing budgetary resources" to section 288(d),
the legislature is attempting to avoid the application of article XIII B, section 6 to the state.
1989 Cal. Leg. Serv. ch. 1402, see. 15, at 5276-77 (West).
The legislature's success in exempting the state from liability and the correctness of the
legislative counsel's analysis of section 288(d) is beyond the scope of this article. What is clear
is that legislature believes at least some funding should be provided from somewhere under
section 288(d). What is also clear is that payment of the state does not change the child's
counsel into an agent of the state. See infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2 (a)-(b) (West Supp. 1989) (assignment of counsel
chargeable to county government).
233. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
544 (1987).
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The attorney's appointment by the court does not make him a
state actor either. In determining that appointed criminal defense
counsel in a federal case was not absolutely immune to a state
malpractice suit brought by his client, the Supreme Court stated that:
the primary office performed by appointed counsel parallels the
office of privately retained counsel. Although it is true that ap-
pointed counsel serves pursuant to statutory authorization and in
furtherance of the federal interest in insuring effective representation
of criminal defendants, his duty is not to the public at large, except
in that general way. His principal responsibility is to serve the
undivided interests of his client.2 4
The child's attorney's sole goal is to prevent psychological harm
to the child.25 Like appointed defense counsel, he will achieve his
goal by serving the "undivided interests of his client." Thus, like
appointed defense counsel, his appointment does not make him a
creature of the state.
In Polk County v. Dodson,26 the Supreme Court rejected the
assertion that a public defender acted under color of state law when
exercising her independent professional judgment.237 Here a full-time
employee of the state38 was not a state actor when acting in her
professional capacity because public defenders act independently from
the state in exercising professional judgment. 9 While the child's
attorney is not in the same adversarial position as the public defender
is against the district attorney,m his interests are not the same as the
district attorney's and may conflict with them. The state is chiefly
concerned with convicting the defendant, while the child's attorney's
duty is to shield the child from psychological harm.24
When the attorney prevents the defense attorney from speaking
with his client he is not doing it out of any desire to convict defendant
at all costs; he is doing it out of a legitimate concern for the well-
being-of a particularly vulnerable client. The child's attorney does
not control the prosecution. 2 His only client is the child; the people
are the clients of the district attorneyY23 The role of the child's
234. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
235. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(d) (Vest Supp. 1990).
236. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
237. Id. at 325.
238. Id. at 314.
239. Id. at 319.
240. See id. at 318.
241. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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attorney is closest to that of appointed counsel for defendant. Each
represents the interests of a private individual in a criminal action.
Each is solely concerned with preventing certain harms from befalling
their respective clients. Neither has ultimate control over the prose-
cution of the case. The only connection either has with the govern-
ment is the appointment as counsel and possibly the manner of
compensation. 244 Both are essentially private attorneys doing a public
service245 and the state is not constitutionally responsible for the
actions of either.
CONCLUSION
Penal Code section 288(d), if properly applied by the courts, can
provide the molested child with a host of protections throughout the
criminal case.24 Courts should not be afraid to use section 288(d) to
help the children. As long as a procedure is constitutional and
beneficial to the child's psyche, a court is required by section 288(d)
to implement that procedure. The Hochheiser court was concerned
about infringing upon defendants' rights.2 7 Once this hurdle is over-
come there is no barrier to broad, creative uses of section 288(d) to
alleviate the myriad of harms our criminal justice system can inflict
upon the child. Appointing counsel to represent the child is just one
of many potential uses of section 288(d). The only barriers to the
use of section 288(d) should be the constitution and the hurt the
child feels. While the former will place real limits on what a court
can do under section 288(d) 248 the latter, unfortunately, is virtually
limitless under our current criminal justice system.
Using section 288(d) to get counsel for the child is one major
remedy to the child's problems. The child will be less alone in the
criminal proceedings. He will have someone who can and will protect
his interests. He will have a champion who will fight for his rights
when he is incapable of asserting them and will protect him from
the greater interests that threaten to crush him. He will have someone
who is not a tool of the prosecution, the courts or defendant. He
244. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
246. For a list of some of the procedures section 288(d) could be used to support, see
Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 791 n.9, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 282 n.9.
247. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
248. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
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will have someone who knows what his rights are and how to defend
them. He will have someone with a duty to act only in his interests
and protect all his rights.
